This was another Mossad false flag. The Mossad lured Chechen rebels to take part in the attack by posing as Chechens or Muslim sympathizers from outside of Russia. The attack was done ostensibly by a group of Chechens, but the real architects of the hostage crisis were Israelis. The Chechens were the front-men. The Israelis worked behind them and insinuated themselves among them, blending in with them so that to an outsider, it looked like an all-Chechen team. The Chechens did not ask too many questions of the people who assisted them. The Chechens probably did not realize they were Jewish and mistook them for sympathetic Muslims. Plus, these people brought with them much-needed aid and equipment for which the Chechens felt grateful. The Mossad had a lot of help from the inside. The Israelis anticipated the FSB and special forces would get involved in the attack. The Mossad agents had “insiders” or people monitoring the FSB and Spetsnaz special forces as well as access to government computers through inserting PROMIS-type spying software into the Russian government computers (see PROMIS software http://mailstar.net/bugs.html). In this way, the Israelis were able to know every move the Russians were planning, and the result of this was a tragedy – people died in the rescue attempt or shortly afterwards.
IMAGE: Hostage-takers in the theater. The masked men are probably Mossad. The man showing his face is Chechen. However, the public think that all the hostage-takers are Chechen.
The high death toll was blamed on the Russians being too heavy-handed with the incapacitating aerosol they sent into the theater via its ventilation system to immobilize the hostage-takers before they attempted the rescue. However, this was not the actual cause of the high numbers of people dying. The real reason why so many people died was the Israelis wanted to kill as many people in the theater as possible. They wanted to kill the maximum number of hostages because hostages could give testimony about what happened in the theater that showed perhaps that the Chechen rebels had outside help, and they wanted to kill all the Chechen rebels as any Chechen rebel caught alive could provide testimony that might give the Israelis away.
There were many features about the hostage crisis that were pointed out by a couple of journalists. Although the journalists were pointing an accusing finger in the wrong direction (they claimed the attack was an inside job, that is, carried out by the Russian government), they did raise enough doubts about the official story to make the Israelis extremely uncomfortable.
The Israelis solved their problem this way. They assassinated the people pursuing this alternative line of enquiry, reinforcing in the minds of some that the journalists were indeed on the right track accusing the government of being behind the Moscow theater attack. Thus, they threw the scent off away from themselves. The people who were suspicious that the attack was not what it was being portrayed at and felt there was more to it than the official account would become even more convinced that the journalists were right to suspect the government.
The Israelis thus killed two birds with one stone. They got rid of the troublesome journalists and they reinforced in the minds of those who smelled a conspiracy that there was a conspiracy and one that had the government behind it. Thus the Israelis were able to divert attention away from themselves.
IMAGE: Leaders of the hostage-takers in the theater.
Moscow theater hostage crisis
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|Moscow theater hostage crisis|
Alleged leaders of the hostage-takers in the theater.
(Jpg file of “Dubrovkaht” was deleted – see note below)
|Date||October 23, 2002–26 October 2002|
|Attack type||Hostage crisis|
|Deaths||At least 129 hostages, at least 170 total|
|Perpetrator(s)||Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (Chechen rebel group)
Movsar Barayev (leader)
Abu Bakar (deputy leader)
Shamil Basayev (claimed responsibility for organisation)
|Claimed motive||Independence for Chechnya|
|[hide] Terrorist attacks of the Second Chechen War|
|Kaspiysk bombing – Moscow hostage crisis – Stavropol bombing – Red Square bombing – Moscow metro bombing – Aircraft bombings – Beslan hostage crisis|
The Moscow theater hostage crisis was the seizure of a crowded Moscow theatre on October 23, 2002 by about 40 armed Chechen Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) militants who claimed allegiance to the separatist movement in Chechnya. They took 850 hostages and demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya and an end to the Second Chechen War.
After a two-and-a-half day siege, Russian OSNAZ forces pumped unknown gas into the building’s ventilation system and raided it. Officially, 39 of the terrorists were killed by Russian forces, along with at least 129 of the hostages. Some estimates have put the civilian death toll at more than 200, with 204 names on one list.
 Hostage taking
The hostage taking took place at the Theatrical Center (TC) of State Ball-Bearing Plant Number 1, a Moscow theater named after its former owner, in the Dubrovka area of Moscow. During Act II of a sold-out performance of Nord-Ost, some 42 heavily-armed men and women drove in a truck to the theater and entered through the scene.
The militants took approximately 850 people hostage—including members of the audience, performers and a Russian police general. The reaction of spectators inside the theater to the news that the theatre was under terrorist attack was not uniform. Some people remained calm, some reacted hysterically, and others fainted. Some performers who had been resting backstage escaped through an open window and called police. They reported that approximately half of the terrorists were women, which was highly unusual.
The gunmen—led by Movsar Barayev, nephew of a slain Chechen militia commander Arbi Barayev—threatened to kill the hostages unless Russian forces were immediately and unconditionally withdrawn from Chechnya. At first, the Russian authorities incorrectly announced that the terrorists demanded payment of “huge amounts” of ransom money.
|“||Every nation has the right to their fate. Russia has taken away this right from the Chechens and today we want to reclaim these rights, which Allah has given us, in the same way he has given it to other nations. Allah has given us the right of freedom and the right to choose our destiny. And the Russian occupiers have flooded our land with our children’s blood. And we have longed for a just solution. People are unaware of the innocent who are dying in Chechnya: the sheikhs, the women, the children and the weak ones. And therefore, we have chosen this approach. This approach is for the freedom of the Chechen people and there is no difference in where we die, and therefore we have decided to die here, in Moscow. And we will take with us the lives of hundreds of sinners. If we die, others will come and follow us—our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice their lives, in Allah’s way, to liberate their nation. Our nationalists have died but people have said that they, the nationalists, are terrorists and criminals. But the truth is Russia is the true criminal.||”|
According to the Kremlin’s aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky, “When they were told that the withdrawal of troops was unrealistic within the short period, that it was a very long process, the terrorists put forward the demand to withdraw Russian troops from anywhere in the Republic of Chechnya without specifying which area it was.”
The militants also demanded termination of the use of heavy weapons (namely artillery and air forces in Chechnya) starting the next day, a halt to the notorious “mopping-up” operations, and that the President of Russia (Putin) should publicly declare that he was striving to stop the war in Chechnya.
Cellphone conversations with hostages trapped in the building revealed that the hostage-takers had grenades and other explosives strapped to their bodies, and had deployed more explosives throughout the theatre. A majority of these explosives (including all those worn by the female militants) were later found to be military dummies.
The situation in the hall was nervous and it frequently changed depending on the mood of the hostage-takers, who were following reports in the mass media. Any kind of misinformation caused hopelessness among the hostages and new aggression among the terrorists, who would threaten to shoot hostages and blow up the building; however, no major disasters took place during the duration of the siege.
 October 23
Some 15 children and a man with a heart condition were released on the first day. Two women managed to escape (one of them was injured).
A young woman under the influence of alcohol, Olga Romanova (26), managed to make her way through the police cordon and enter the theatre. She confronted the terrorists and urged the hostages to stand up to their captors. The terrorists decided she was a Federal Security Service (FSB) agent and fatally shot her. Her body was later removed from the building by a Russian medical team, incorrectly reported as a corpse of an executed hostage.
 October 24
The United Nations Security Council demanded the “immediate and unconditional release” of all hostages. The Russian government offered terrorists the opportunity to leave for any third country. The hostages appealed to President Putin to stop hostilities in Chechnya and asked him to refrain from assaulting the building.
Terrorists demanded that representatives of the International Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres come to the theatre to lead negotiations. FSB Colonel Konstantin Vasilyev attempted to get onto the patio of the TC, but he was shot at by the terrorists as he approached the building.
Well-known public and political figures such as Aslambek Aslakhanov, Iosif Kobzon, Irina Khakamada, Boris Nemtsov and Grigory Yavlinsky took part in negotiations with the terrorists. Ex-President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev also announced his willingness to act as an intermediary in the course of negotiations. Negotiations on the release of non-Russian nationals were conducted by various embassies and the Chechens promised to release all foreign hostages.
According to the FSB, 39 hostages were set free on October 24, 2002. The terrorists declared that they were ready to release 50 hostages if Akhmad Kadyrov, head of Chechnya administration, would come to the theatre. Kadyrov did not answer, and that release did not take place.
 October 25
Over the course of the next day, the following people took part in negotiations with the terrorists: journalists Anna Politkovskaya, Sergey Govorukhin and Mark Franchetti; public and political figures Evgeny Primakov, Ruslan Aushev and again Aslambek Aslakhanov. The terrorists demanded to negotiate with any official representative of Vladimir Putin.
The terrorists agreed to release 75 foreign citizens in the presence of diplomatic representatives of their states. However, Russian authorities insisted that terrorists not separate the hostages into foreign and Russian citizens. Instead, the terrorists released eight more children with no conditions.
A group of Russian doctors including Dr. Leonid Roshal entered the theatre to bring medicines for the hostages. NTV channel journalists also recorded an interview with Movsar Barayev, where he announced that he could release all the children by morning.
At 9:55 p.m., four more hostages (citizens of Azerbaijan) were released, bringing the total number of hostages that were set free on this day to 19. According to an arrangement reached with the terrorists, citizens of the United States and Kazakhstan were to be set free the next morning.
After dusk, the man identified as Gennady Vlakh ran across the square and managed to gain entry to the theatre. He told that his son was among the hostages, but his son did not seem to be present and the man was led away and fatally shot. Ten minutes later, another man was seen headed in the same direction, but he returned unharmed.
Around midnight, a gunfire incident took place as a hostage ran over the backs of theatre seats toward the female terrorist who was sitting next to a large improvised explosive device. A male hostage-taker shot at him and missed, but stray bullets hit and severely wounded two other hostages, Tamara Starkova and Pavel Zakharov, who were evacuated from the building soon after. (There was a short delay on the part of the Russian authorities.)
 October 26
During the night, Akhmed Zakayev, a Chechen envoy and associate of the separatist president Aslan Maskhadov, appealed to the “extremists” and asked them to “refrain from rash steps”. Two members of the OMON police special forces were wounded by a grenade fired from the building.
 Special forces raid
Early Saturday morning, October 26, 2002, forces from Russia’s OSNAZ (or “special forces”) from the FSB, with the assistance of the MVD (Interior Ministry) SOBR unit, surrounded and stormed the building. Representatives of emergency operations HQ reported that the assault operation was triggered when the terorists allegedly started shooting hostages.
 Gas attack
At approximately 5:00 a.m., the searchlights that had been illuminating the main entrance to the TC went out. Hostage Anna Andrianova, a correspondent for Moskovskaya Pravda, called Echo of Moscow radio studio and told on-air that the government forces had begun an operation by pumping gas into the hall:
They are gassing us! All the people are sitting in the hall … We beg not to be gassed! We see it, we feel it, we are breathing through our clothes … Please give us a chance. If you can do anything, please do … That’s it! We are all going to be blown up. Our government has decided no one should leave here alive.
It is thought that the security services pumped a aerosol anaesthetic into the theatre – later reported to be weaponized Fentanyl – through the air conditioning system. After thirty minutes, when the gas had taken effect, a physical assault on the building commenced. The combined forces entered through numerous building openings, including the roof and through the sewers.
 Storming of the theater
The raid was preceded by the sound of sporadic gunfire and explosions from within the theatre. Inside, it became apparent to gunmen and hostages alike that a gas had been pumped into the building. Hostages reported that some people in the audience fell asleep, and some of the gunmen put on respirators. As terrorists and hostages began to fall unconscious, several of the female hostage-takers made a dash for the balcony but passed out before they reached the stairs.
After nearly one and a half hour of sporadic gun battles, the special forces soldiers blew open the doors to the main hall and poured into the auditorium. In a fierce firefight, the Russian special forces gunned down those terrorists who were still awake and executed those who had succumbed to the gas.
The fighting between the soldiers and terrorists continued in other parts of the building for another 30 minutes or more. Initial reports stated that three terrorists were captured alive, but two of them managed to escape. As of May 2007, the fate of ten of the terrorists officially remains unknown.
 Chaotic rescue action
At 7:00 a.m., rescuers began carrying the bodies of hostages out of the building. Bodies were laid in rows on the pavement at the main entrance to the TC, unprotected from falling rain and snow. Shortly, the entire space was filled with bodies of the dead and those unconscious from the gas but still alive. Few ambulances were standing by, and those that were had to wait ten minutes or more until they were given permission to pass through the security cordon.
The bodies of dead hostages were stowed in two buses, which were parked at the TC. Nevertheless, initial reports said nothing about casualties among the hostages. HQ representatives went to the college hall, where relatives of the hostages had been waiting, and told them “there are no victims among the hostages”. Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Vladimir Vasilyev falsely announced that special forces had been forced to start the assault because a group of hostages had attempted to escape.
The first official report of fatalities among the hostages came at about 9:00 am. Despite the death of five children which had been already reported by medical personnel, the official statement claimed there were no children among the dead. Authorities said nothing about the use of chemical agents in the raid.
At 1:00 p.m., Vasilyev reported at a press conference that 67 people had died, but again did not mention the deaths of any children. He claimed he only had the authority to state that special chemical agents had been used and that some 30 of the “bandits” and “their accomplices” had been captured alive in the area around the theater and in other parts of the city. Later, the government stated that all the terrorists had been killed, including one unconscious woman who was executed outside the theatre by a woman in an FSB uniform.
Armed guards were posted at the hospitals where victims were taken, and doctors were ordered not to release any of the theatre patients in case terrorists had concealed themselves among the hostages. The survivors were cut off from any communication with the outside world and their relatives were not allowed inside the hospitals. The hostages’ family members panicked as the government refused to release any information about which hospitals their loved ones had been taken to, or even whether their relatives were among the dead. The federal media published an incorrect list of hospitals which had allegedly admitted the former hostages.
There were several Chechens among the hostages and it is believed that some of them were not treated because of their Chechen names. In addition, money and other valuables belonging to the victims vanished. Official reports stated that the valuables were stolen by an FSB officer who was later killed in a car crash.
At least 33 terrorists and 129 hostages died during the raid or in the following days. Doctor Andrei Seltsovsky, Moscow’s health committee chairman, announced that all but one of the hostages killed in the raid had died of the effects of the unknown gas rather than from gunshot wounds.
The cause of death listed for all hostages was declared to be “terrorism”. About 700 surviving hostages were poisoned by gas, and some of them became invalids of the second and third category; several special forces servicemen were also poisoned by the gas during the operation. Sixty-nine children were made orphans.
Russian President Vladimir Putin defended the raid in a televised address later on the morning of October 26, stating that the government had “achieved the near impossible, saving hundreds, hundreds of people”. He also asked forgiveness for not being able to save more of the hostages, and declared Monday a national day of mourning for those who died.
 Long-term effects
The attacks prompted Putin to tighten Russia’s grip on Chechnya. The Russian government’s media agency reported that 30 rebel fighters were killed in a battle outside the Chechen capital Grozny on October 28, 2002, and Putin announced that unspecified “measures adequate to the threat” would henceforth be taken in response to terrorist activity. President Maskhadov’s unconditional offer for peace talks with Russia was dismissed, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov compared calls with the suggestion that Europe should conduct such talks with Osama bin Laden.
Russia also accused Akhmed Zakayev of involvement in the attack. When he visited Denmark for a peace congress in October 2002, the Russians demanded his arrest and extradition. Zakayev was held for over a month, but was released after Danish authorities stated they were not convinced that sufficient evidence had been provided. British authorities arrested him but he was released on bail, paid by Vanessa Redgrave among others. His extradition proceedings then collapsed and December 7, 2002, he was given political asylum in Britain.
On November 1, 2002, the lower house of the Duma approved broad new restrictions on press coverage of terrorism-related incidents, widely expected to meet with swift approval by the upper house and then Putin. The Duma refused to consider a proposal by the liberal Union of Right Forces party to form an investigative commission charged with probing the government’s actions in the theatre siege. These new policies prompted renewed fears in Russia that Putin is systematically taking control of all Russian media.
Rebel military commander Shamil Basayev posted a statement on his website claiming responsibility for the incident, resigning all official positions within the Chechen government, and apologizing to the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov for not informing him of the planned raid. The Russian government claimed that wiretapped phone conversations prove that Maskhadov knew of the plans in advance, which he denied. Maskhadov and his representatives in the West condemned the attack.
Some commentators have suggested that Movladi Udugov was in charge from behind the scenes. A Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer has suggested that the aim of the extremist leaders seemed to have been to provoke the Russian government forces “to kill ethnic Russians in Moscow on a large scale”, which happened.
 Official investigation
The investigation that the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office has been carrying out for three and a half years failed to provide positive information on the gas agent that killed hostages, possible antidote to that agent, the number of hostages released by the operation, the number of terrorists who had seized the theater (hostages claimed that they saw more than 50 militants, whereas only 40 hostage takers were in the building according to the official version), and the names of officials who had made the decision about the assault.
Also in April 2007, Tatiana Karpova, co-chair of the Nord-Ost Organization of former hostages and families of the dead, demanded a new criminal investigation. She has claimed the authorities failed to meet their obligations related to right to life. She claimed they have proof that “69 casualties were given no medical care” and that “80 percent of surviving hostages are potential invalids, including future (occurrence of) oncology diseases, (the possibility that) women who were subjected to gas attack (could) give birth to defective babies.
 An attempt of independent investigation
An independent investigation of the event was undertaken by Russian politicians Sergei Yushenkov, Sergei Kovalev, journalist Anna Politkovskaya, Hoover Institute scholar John B. Dunlop, and former FSB officers Aleksander Litvinenko and Mikhail Trepashkin. According to their version, FSB knew about the terrorist group arrived to Moscow and directed them to the theater through their agent provocateur Khanpasha Terkibayev (“Abu Bakar”), whose name was in list of hostage takers and who left the theater alive.
In the beginning of April 2003 former FSB Aleksander Litvinenko gave information about Terkibaev (“the Terkibaev file”) to Sergei Yushenkov when he visited London. Yushenkov passed this file to Politkovskaya and she was able to interview Terkibaev in person. A few days later, Yushenkov was assassinated. Terkibaev was later killed in a car crash in Chechnya.
In June 2003, Litvinenko stated in an interview with the Australian television programme Dateline, that two of the Chechen terrorists involved in the siege—whom he named “Abdul the Bloody” and “Abu Bakar”—were working for the FSB, and that the agency manipulated the rebels into staging the attack. Litvinenko said: “[w]hen they tried to find [Abdul the Bloody and Abu Bakar] among the dead terrorists, they weren’t there. The FSB got its agents out. So the FSB agents among Chechens organized the whole thing on FSB orders, and those agents were released.” The story about FSB connections with the hostage takers was also put forward by Mikhail Trepashkin. “Abu Bakar” (presumably Terkibayev) was also described as FSB agent and actual organizer of the terrorist act by Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Khinshtein and other journalists.
According to Yuri Levada, Director of the VCIOM: “In the minds of the Russians, the terrorist attack in Dubrovka has remained the most monstrous deed of the special services, though the authorities are still keeping silence about it.”
The suspicions were also fueled by the following circumstances:
- There had been allegations that Barayev clan worked for FSB for years.
- Police overlooked arrival of 50 terrorists with tons of ammunition in Moscow.
- Rebel women who provided no resistance being unconscious were shot execution style by special forces.
- Hostage takers did not set off their waist-belt bombs, even though it took several minutes for the gas to take effect, and everyone felt the smell of the gas according to hostage testimonies.
 European Court complaint
In April 2007, Igor Trunov, claimants’ advocate, reported that the European Court for Human Rights had finally begun hearings into a complaint filed in 2003 by 58 victims against the Russian government. Trunov added that not only Russian citizens, but also those from Ukraine, the Netherlands and Kazakhstan, filed complaints in the Strasbourg Court.
 The gas mystery
It was reported that efforts to treat victims were complicated because the Russian government refused to inform doctors what type of gas had been used. In the records of the official investigation, the agent is referred to as a “gaseous substance”. In other cases it is referred to as an “unidentified chemical substance”.
The Russian Federation, as a member-state of the Chemical Weapons Convention, undertook “never and under no circumstances to carry out any activities prohibited to member-states of this Convention” to develop, to accumulate, to stockpile and to use chemical weapons—toxic chemicals that can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals.
The Convention obliges the states to fulfill the conditions of toxic chemicals use that allow to exclude or considerably reduce the degree of injury and gravity of consequences. However, during the special operation in Dubrovka this provision was disregarded, i.e. neither the type, nor the quantity of the chemical agent helped to attain the set purpose—to neutralize the terrorists so as to rescue the hostages.
 See also
- Second Chechen War crimes and terrorism
- Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis (June 1995)
- Kizlyar raid (January 1996)
- Beslan school hostage crisis (September 2004)
- List of hostage crises
- ^ 
- ^ 
- ^ 
- ^ 
- ^ 
- ^ Anna Politkovskaya: Putin’s Russia, The Harvill Press 2004
- ^ 
- ^ Nord-Ost Tragedy Goes On, Moscow News 2004 N.41 – a discussion of the long-term effects of the anesthetic on the surviving hostages
- ^ a b Gas ‘killed Moscow hostages’, BBC News, October 27, 2002
- ^ Dead link: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/10/28102002134429.asp archived at internet archive Russia: Putin Vows to Take ‘Appropriate Measures’ Against Terrorists], Radio Free Europe, October 28. 2002
- ^ Putin vows to crush rebels, BBC News, October 28, 2002
- ^ 
- ^ 
- ^ On the Situation of Ethnic Chechens in Moscow Human Rights Watch
- ^ Russian Lawmakers Vote to Curb News Media – Terrorism Reporting Restricted After Crisis Peter Baker, Washington Post partial preview, November 2 2002, A.18
- ^ Russia Defends Actions Taken in Theater Siege – No Regrets About Use of Gas or Secrecy, Peter Baker, Washington Post partial preview, November 1 2002, A.30
- ^ 
- ^ 
- ^ a b (Russian) Investigation of the case of hostage taking at the Theatre Center at Dubrovka in October, 2002, was suspended.. Machine translation. Echo of Moscow News Service (June 1, 2007).
- ^ 
- ^ The October 2002 Moscow Hostage-Taking Incident (Part 1) by John B. Dunlop, Radio Free Europe Reports, 18 December 2003.
- ^ The October 2002 Moscow Hostage-Taking Incident (Part 2) by John B. Dunlop, Radio Free Europe Reports, 8 January 2004.
- ^ The October 2002 Moscow Hostage-Taking Incident (Part 3) by John B. Dunlop, Radio Free Europe Reports, 15 January 2004.
- ^ Radio FreeLiberty The Moscow Hostage Crisis: one year later – by John Dunlop, Radio Free Europe Reports, 29 October 2003.
- ^ a b Alex Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko. Death of a dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB, The Free Press (2007) ISBN 1-416-55165-4
- ^ Lazaredes, Nick (04 June 2003). Terrorism takes front stage — Russia’s theatre siege. SBS. Retrieved on 2006–11-28.
- ^ Dissident lawyer jailed on trumped up charges
- ^ Litvinenko `Rebellion’ Poses Awkward Questions: Cannes Roundup By Iain Millar
- ^ Where is “ABUBAKAR?”
- ^ Russian Authorities Hedge Over Special Services Involvement In Moscow Theater Siege, by Anna Politkovskaya, Novaya Gazeta, May 5, 2003
- ^ A Critical Analysis of Western Realpolitik. The Case of Russia and Chechnya
- ^ The Moscow Hostage-Taking Incident (Part 1) By John B. Dunlop, Radio Free Europe
- ^ Chechen Bank Formation by Alek Akhundov, Kommersant Oct. 28, 2004]
- ^ 
- ^ Conclusions of forensic examination commission, Volumes 30-33 of the criminal case
 Further reading
- “NORD-OST” INVESTIGATION UNFINISHED Events, facts, conclusions Report on the crisis and legal proceedings, published on April 26, 2006.
- With Appendixes in Russian (Appendices translated).
 External links
- Theater of War TIME Magazine special report
- The first victim of October’s terror attack on the Nord-Ost Moscow musical theatre (10/23/2002)
- 2006 report on the crisis by the organization of former hostages
- Russia Confirms Suspicions About Gas Used in Raid, Washington Post partial preview, October 31, 2002
- 115 Hostages in Moscow Killed by Gas, Washington Post partial preview, October 27, 2002
- A BBC transcript regarding the incident